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I. Introduction 
This Article summarizes and discusses important developments in West 
Virginia oil and gas law between August 1, 2018, and July 30, 2019.  This 
Article is divided into two parts.  The first part will discuss common law 
developments in both State and Federal courts. The second part will discuss 
statutory developments in legislations and regulations.  
II. Judicial Developments 
This section will first discuss two oil and gas cases decided by West 
Virginia’s highest court.  Next, decisions issued by West Virginia’s federal 
district courts, and decisions by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals will be 
discussed and presented in chronological order as the decisions were handed 
down by the courts. 
A. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
EQT Prod. Co. v. Crowder, 
In June 2019, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia held that a mineral owner does not have a right to use the overlying 
surface to benefit mining or drilling operations for other lands.1 Absent an 
express agreement from the surface owners, the Court held that using the 
surface to benefit other lands is trespassing.2  
In this case, EQT Production Company (“EQT”) held a century-old lease 
in Doddridge County, West Virginia, permitting the company to drill oil and 
gas wells on the Carr tract.3 The 1901 lease remained in effect, but over time 
the surface was severed from the minerals and the surface was divided into 
several parcels.4 In 2011, the owners of the tract’s mineral rights signed an 
amendment allowing EQT to “pool and/or unitize and combine the rights 
provided by the 1901 lease with other leases to drill and extract oil and gas 
under neighboring lands.”5 EQT then began preparations for a horizontal 
Marcellus shale gas well on the Plaintiffs’ surface lands.6 The wells were 
                                                                                                                 
 1. EQT Prod. Co. v. Crowder, 828 S.E.2d 800, 811 (W. Va. 2019).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. at 802. 
 4. Id. at 803.  
 5. Id.at 804.  
 6. Id.  
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designed to extract gas from 3,232 acres of land, and not just the 351 acres 
originally covered by the Carr lease.7 
Before EQT started drilling, the Plaintiffs’ attorney notified EQT that it 
only had the right to use “their surface lands as ‘reasonably necessary to 
extract the severed minerals from beneath the Carr tract.’”8 In spite of this, 
EQT entered Plaintiffs’ surface parcels and prepared the area to be drilled.9 
By June 2014, EQT “had drilled some 9.7 miles of horizontal bores under 
neighboring properties.”10 
Subsequently, the Plaintiffs filed suit for trespass in November 2014.11 
The Plaintiffs argued, and the circuit court agreed, “that EQT has the implied 
right to use the Plaintiffs’ surface lands for ‘well pads, roads, and pipelines 
to drill into, and produce gas from, but only from, the mineral tract,’ 
underlying the [Carr Tract.]”12 Further, EQT “did not have an express or 
implied right to enter or use the surface lands to drill and produce gas from 
neighboring mineral tracts.”13 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $190,000 in 
trespass damages and EQT appealed.14 The Supreme Court of Appeals 
affirmed the ruling, concluding that “[u]sing the surface to extract minerals 
elsewhere, without the permission of the surface owner, is a trespass.”15 
Thus, a mineral owner or lessee must reach a separate agreement with a 
surface owner to access minerals under neighboring land.16  
Andrews v. Antero Res. Corp. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals found Antero Resources Corporation’s 
(“Antero”) horizontal well development did not constitute a nuisance 
because the actions were necessary, within its implied rights as mineral right 
owners, and did not substantially burden neighboring property owners’ use 
of their lands.17  
Antero operated several well pads for horizontal drilling in Harrison 
County.18 Its drilling authority came from century-old severance deeds that 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 805.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 811.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Andrews v. Antero Res. Corp., 828 S.E.2d 858, 873 (W. Va. 2019).  
 18. Id. at 861. 
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retained mineral rights underlying certain properties.19 The leases also 
allowed for 
the right to drill, bore and operate for [oil and gas] at any time, 
also the right to use water from said land for the purpose of said 
drilling, boring and operating, and the right at any time to remove 
all necessary machinery used for the last named purposes, upon or 
off said land.20  
In addition to constructing and operating the horizontal wells, the project also 
required truck deliveries and the development of “well roads, pipelines, and 
a compressor station.”21  
The plaintiff-property owners claimed that the development of the 
Marcellus shale affected the use and enjoyment of their properties “due to 
the annoyance, inconvenience, and discomfort caused by excessive heavy 
equipment and truck traffic, diesel fumes and other emissions from the 
trucks, gas fumes and odors, vibrations, noise, lights, and dust.”22 However, 
none of the horizontal wells were on the plaintiff-property owners’ surface 
land, and Antero held leasehold rights to the oil and gas underlying their 
lands.23  
The property owners filed suit, which was transferred from the circuit 
court to the Mass Litigation Panel (“MLP”). The MLP granted summary 
judgement for Antero based on its development rights in the severance deeds 
and found the complained-of activities to be “reasonable and necessarily 
incident to Antero’s development of the underlying minerals.”24 The MLP 
did not apply the principals of nuisance law in its reasoning and the plaintiff-
property owners appealed.25  
The Supreme Court of Appeals applied a two-part test to determine if 
Antero’s activity constituted a nuisance.26 The plaintiff-property owners 
needed to provide evidence that (1) Antero’s activities were not reasonably 
necessary for developing the Marcellus shale and (2) their use of the 
properties were substantially burdened by the activities.27 The Court found 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (brackets original). 
 21. Id. at 861-62.  
 22. Id. at 862. 
 23. Id. at 861-63.  
 24. Id. at 862-63.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 870 (citing Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721 (1980)).  
 27. Id. 
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the plaintiffs failed to meet either requirement because the wells were not on 
their surface property, did not damage their land, and Antero’s activities were 
reasonable for mineral development.28  
*Note: The Author’s firm represented Antero Resources Corporation in 
the case.   
B. Federal Courts 
Bison Resources Corp. v. Antero Resources Corp. 
In September 2018, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of West Virginia ruled that a right of first refusal (“ROFR”) is a 
personal right and does not transfer to a successor without express 
language.29 The court granted summary judgment to Antero Resources 
Corporation and held that Antero owned the rights to the subject leases free 
of the ROFR.30  
Over a forty-year period, the subject leases had been conveyed to several 
parties, including Bison Resources Corporation (“Bison”) and Antero.31 The 
first assignment of the leases included a “right[] of first refusal to drill any 
additional wells.”32 After acquiring all rights, titles, and interest in the subject 
leases, excluding “[Bison’s] wellbore interest and an overriding royalty 
interest,” Antero began drilling wells to the Marcellus Shale.33  
As Antero started producing natural gas, Bison filed suit for trespass, 
conversion, and tortious interference, claiming the Antero had not provided 
it with prior notice before drilling new wells and did not offer a right of first 
refusal to drill.34 However, Antero argued, and the court agreed, that Bison 
did not have a valid right of first refusal because the right was personal to 
those named in the first assignment of the subject leases.35 The assignment 
did not include references to successors or assigns, indicating to the court 
that the ROFR was only intended to bind the original parties.36 Thus, Antero 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 873.  
 29. Bison Res. Corp. v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:16CV107, 2018 WL 4558474, at *5 
(N.D.W. Va. Sept. 21, 2018). 
 30. Id. at *6.  
 31. Id. at *2. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at *1-2. 
 35. Id. at *4-5.  
 36. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
324 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
 
 
owned the oil and gas rights because the ROFR did not transfer and was no 
longer valid.37 
*Note: The Author’s firm represented Antero Resources Corporation in 
the case.   
Berghoff v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC 
In Berghoff, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held 
that a lessee failed to properly pool a lessor’s land when the lessee did not 
mail a copy of the pooling declaration to the lessor before the end of the 
primary term.38 In 2006, the Berghoffs leased their oil and gas rights to Great 
Lake Energy Partners and its successor-in-interest Chesapeake Appalachia, 
LLC (“Chesapeake”) with a five-year primary term.39 The secondary term 
allowed the lease to be renewed for as long as Chesapeake searched for oil 
or gas, or as long as oil and gas was able to be produced.40 The lease included 
a pooling provision that allowed the lessee to consolidate the land into larger 
units.41 However, the lessee had to record a declaration of consideration and 
“mail[] a copy thereof to the Lessor.”42 
Towards the end of the primary term, the lessee abandoned a well pad 
location because the lessor and lessee could not agree on a site for the well’s 
access road.43 Following this, Chesapeake began building a well pad on 
adjoining land and spudded a well, with the intention to consolidate the 
properties into a unit.44 With twelve days left in the primary term, 
Chesapeake executed and recorded a “Declaration and Notice of Pooled 
Unit”45 but failed to mail a copy to the Berghoffs until two years after the 
primary term of the lease expired.46 When Chesapeake sent the Berghoffs 
royalty payments, they refused them and filed suit claiming the lessee 
produced oil and gas from their land without consent. 47 After the case was 
removed to federal court, the district court granted the lessee’s motion for 
summary judgement and found that because land within the unit had been 
pooled within the primary term, Chesapeake had satisfied the lease 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. at *6.  
 38. Berghoff v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 747 F. App'x 120, 126 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 39. Id. at 121-22. 
 40. Id. at 122. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 123. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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requirements.48 The Berghoffs then appealed, and the Fourth Circuit ruled in 
their favor.49 
The Fourth Circuit found that oil and gas can only be pooled “in 
accordance with the method and purposes as provided in the pooling 
clause.”50 Therefore, Chesapeake did not properly pool the leased premises 
into the unit because it did not mail a copy of the pooling declaration to the 
lessors before the end of the primary term, as required by the pooling 
clause.51 The court also addressed a side issue regarding the access route to 
the well pad, and found the record had been too thin for the district court to 
have ruled for the lessee.52 The district court’s ruling was vacated and 
remanded for further proceedings.53 
Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the 
Mountain Valley Pipeline’s Clean Water Act Nationwide permit 12 (“NWP 
12”) verification after ruling that the US Army Corps of Engineers (“Army 
Corps”) violated Section 401 of the Clean Water Act.54 The court also 
determined that the Army Corps cannot substitute state special conditions 
with its own special conditions.55 And further, a state cannot waive its own 
special conditions for specific cases without complying with the Clean Water 
Act’s notice and comment requirements.56  
As designed, the Mountain Valley Pipeline would cross 591 federal bodies 
of water through Virginia and West Virginia.57 The Clean Water Act required 
the pipeline to obtain clearance from the Army Corps before starting 
construction because the construction would involve discharging fill material 
into federal waters.58 The NWP 12 permit allowed for activities such as 
construction to discharge materials in the water which were deemed “to 
create only minimal environmental impact.”59 West Virginia also imposed 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 127. 
 50. Id. at 125 (quoting Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex. 2005)). 
 51. Id. at 126. 
 52. Id. at 124.  
 53. Id. at 127. 
 54. Sierra Club v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 909 F.3d 635, 654 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 55. Id. at 639. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 640 (quoting Crutchfield v. Cty. of Hanover, 325 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(internal citation omitted)). 
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additional conditions for receiving the general permit, including a seventy-
two-hour limitation on individual stream crossings.60 West Virginia then 
waived its requirement for an individual water quality certification.61 
When assessing the proposal, the Army Corps found that the Mountain 
Valley Pipeline incorporated a different method for constructing the pipeline 
that was more protective of the water than West Virginia’s seventy-two-hour 
rule.62 Based on this finding, the Army Corps replaced the State’s special 
condition for the dry open-cut method and issued a verification concluding 
that the pipeline met the criteria of NWP 12.63 This violated Section 401 of 
the Clean Water Act because the Army Corps is required to incorporate the 
State’s certification into the federal verification, without modification.64 
Section 401 requires this from the Army Corps in order to avoid the 
possibility of the Army Corps setting aside state certifications and 
“undermin[ing] the system of cooperative federalism upon which the Clean 
Water Act is premised.”65 Further, West Virginia could not waive its special 
conditions for specific cases without a notice-and-comment period.66 
Therefore, the Mountain Valley Pipeline had not complied with all of the 
terms of NWP 12 and the verification was voided in its entirety.67  
Cowpasture River Pres. Ass'n v. Forest Serv. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the 
United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”) improperly authorized the 
Atlantic Coast Pipeline.68 The pipeline was to be built through parts of the 
George Washington and Monongahela National Forests, spanning twenty-
one miles of the forests.69 The plan also allowed for a right-of-way across the 
Appalachian Trail.70 The planning and proposals had initially been denied or 
critiqued over environmental impact concerns, including “landslides, slope 
failures, sedimentation and impacts to groundwater, soils, and threatened and 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. at 641. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 642. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 647. 
 65. Id. at 648. 
 66. Id. at 653. 
 67. Id. at 655. 
 68. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass'n v. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2018), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 18-1587 (U.S. Sept. 23, 2019). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
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endangered species” that would result from the construction of the pipeline.71 
In April 2016, the Forest Service requested the pipeline developer create ten 
stabilization designs, but the developer only provided two of the requested 
site designs.72 However, in May 2017, the Forest Service withdrew its 
concerns and approved the pipeline and right of way.73 The Forest Service 
determined “major pipeline route alternatives and variations do not offer a 
significant environmental advantage when compared to the proposed route 
or would not be economically practical.”74 Several environmental groups 
then filed a challenge to this decision.75  
The Petitioners claimed the Forest Service violated the National Forest 
Management Act (“NFMA”), the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”), and the Mineral Leasing Act (“MLA”).76 The NFMA created the 
Forest Plans which governs the activities that can take place in the forests.77 
The Forest Service’s recommendation for the pipeline included project-
specific amendments that would exempt the project from thirteen standards 
“relat[ing] to soil, water, riparian, threatened and endangered species, and 
recreational and visual resources.”78 The petitioners argued, and the Fourth 
Circuit agreed, that the Forest Service’s decision was arbitrary and capricious 
in concluding the amendments were not directly related to the Plan’s purpose 
and that it would not have substantial adverse effects on the forest. 79  Thus, 
the Forest Service violated the NFMA. 
The court further found that the Forest Service violated the NEPA because 
it failed to sufficiently consider alternate routes and the environmental 
consequences of the pipeline, including the risks it originally had 
contemplated.80 In addition, the Forest Service did not have the authority to 
grant a right of way through the Appalachian Trail because the Secretary of 
the Interior administers the National Park System.81 The right of way was 
vacated and the petition to review the Forest Service’s decision was 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 156. 
 73. Id. at 158. 
 74. Id. at 159 (citing to a U.S. Forest Service draft Record of Decision (“ROD”)). 
 75. Id. at 160. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 162. 
 79. Id. at 166. 
 80. Id. at 173. 
 81. Id. at 183. 
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granted.82 A Writ of Certiorari was filed and docketed with the United States 
Supreme Court in June 2019.  
Equinor USA Onshore Props. Inc., v. Pine Res., LLC 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a 
contract party cannot recover damages for lost royalties when the 
development contract required drilling three wells, but did not require 
production.83 In 2008, Pine Resources, LLC (“Pine”) sold its Marcellus 
mineral rights in 565 acres of land to PetroEdge Energy (“PetroEdge”), a 
non-party.84 The Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”) set forth that 
PetroEdge would apply for a meter tap and then spud three wells within 
certain time frames.85 In return, Pine retained a royalty interest equal to 18 
percent of the hydrocarbons produced from the mineral rights.86 The two 
parties extended the spudding deadlines multiple times, and PetroEdge 
commenced drilling the first well in December 2011.87 However, the well 
was never completed and did not produce hydrocarbons.88 PetroEdge then 
sold its mineral rights in the land to Equinor USA Onshore Properties, Inc. 
(“Equinor”), formerly Statoil USA Onshore Properties, Inc., stating in the 
contract that the first well obligation had been met and two more would need 
to be drilled by April 1, 2014.89 
Upon notification of the sale, Pine contacted Equinor and informed the 
assignee that it was in violation of the PSA and needed to obtain production 
from the first well and start drilling the remaining wells.90 Equinor responded 
that it would not complete the first well or drill the other two because a meter 
tap had not been installed, which would have triggered the spud obligation.91  
In July 2014, Equinor sought a declaratory judgement stating it owed no 
obligation to Pine beyond royalty payments.92 Pine then countersued for 
breach of contract relating to the spudding obligation.93 In 2017, following a 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. 
 83. Equinor USA Onshore Properties Inc. v. Pine Res., LLC, 917 F.3d 807, 810 (4th Cir. 
2019). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 811. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 812. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
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judgment in favor of Equinor, Pine appealed and the Fourth Circuit reversed 
and remanded.94 Rather than granting summary judgment, the district court 
conducted a bench trial to determine whether the PSA required production 
and to assess damages.95 From the bench trial, the district court determined 
the agreement did not require production, only spudding, and ruled in favor 
of Equinor.96 Further, the district court did not grant damages because the 
evidence was only based on royalty loss and not damages from the failure to 
spud the wells.97 Pine then appealed again to the Fourth Circuit, which 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, stating that “[t]he plain meaning of ‘spud’ 
refers only to the initial drilling of wells, not completion or production.”98 
Thus, Equinor had no further obligation under the PSA and did not owe 
damages.99 
*Note: The Author’s firm represented Equinor USA Onshore Properties, 
Inc., formerly known as Statoil USA Onshore Properties, Inc., in the case.  
III. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
A. Legislative Enactments 
The West Virginia Legislature enacted no statutes between August 1, 
2018, and July 30, 2019 that significantly altered existing West Virginia oil 
and gas law. 
B. Regulatory Changes 
Effective February 11, 2019, title 35 section 7 of the West Virginia Code 
of State Rules, regulating the certification of gas wells, was repealed.100  The 
legislative rule had been in effect since May 10, 2001 and was repealed by 
Senate Bill 240, which repealed legislative rules that were no longer 
authorized or were obsolete.101 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 814.  
 99. Id. at 818. 
 100. W. VA. CODE R. §§ 35-7-1 to 35-7-4 (2019). 
 101. See S.B. 240, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2019).  
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